



INFLUENCING FACTORS ON RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM:

*lessons from Peja, Mitrovica, Gjilan, Ferizaj
and Kacanik*

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SPECIAL ISSUE

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The elucidation of the influencing factors on the radicalization process of Kosovo youth and the spreading of the ideology of violent extremism in Kosovo, is an ongoing necessity. Such factors are quite different, but they all share singular capacities to affect vulnerable individuals.

The views of civil society activists in the five municipalities covered by the implementation of the project, those of public officials, security providers, theologians and experts in the field of violent extremism, help clarify the general knowledge required to guide institutional and civil society efforts in confronting this phenomenon.

Although the issue of radicalization and violent extremism has for years now been under the scrutiny of public opinion in Kosovo, it is difficult to detail the specific causes that facilitate the spreading of this ideology in Kosovo. Further engagement of institutions, partner countries, international and regional organizations and civil society in Kosovo, must hinge on direct communication with public activists, especially at the local level in Kosovo.

The research report "Influencing Factors on Radicalization and Violent Extremism: *lessons from Peja, Mitrovica, Gjilan, Ferizaj and Kacanik*" reveals the indispensability of communication and coordination with local level activists, in order to extend the activities directly to communities and citizens. Obviously, this can be seen as the right way of raising awareness on the prevention of violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, giving special priority and focus to joint work with the community.

The **key findings** on the lessons learned from the activities/dialog in the community, focused on civil society activists, representatives of the Islamic community, local government institutions and security providers, can be summarized as follows:

- The spreading of the ideology of violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism is mainly achieved through the manipulation of the religious sentiment between youth in these municipalities;
- In addition to religious sentiment, radicalized individuals, including the vast majority of those who have joined terrorist organizations in the wars in Syria and Iraq, have shown a great lack of basic knowledge about Islam;
- Civil society activists and municipal governance mechanisms are unclear on the precise and appropriate means of general and specific commitments to effectively restrict the influence of extremist ideologies;
- Aiming at enhancing cooperation between citizens, communities, public institutions, security providers, religious and civil society communities, civil society activists consider that investing in promoting national values, traditional and religious coexistence values, is one of the best ways to prevent violent extremism;
- The lack of direct activities in communities and with individuals, seems to have left a bad taste in the opinions of active citizens in these municipalities. When it comes to their municipalities, activities are only seen in the media, leading public activists in these municipalities to a feeling of neglect of their communities;
- The establishment of thematic capacities for public activists and active citizens is considered indispensable, based on the need to increase the general awareness about violent extremism, in particular on the Kosovo Strategy for the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism 2015-2020;

- It is extremely important to build a professional and well-coordinated approach with all relevant factors, in order to contain and minimize propaganda that manipulates the religious sentiments of youth;
- The production of cultural, recreational, sports and extra-curricular activities with youth and especially pupils and students, is a prerequisite that demands long term focus and planing from central and local institutions, not only an emergency measure;
- Continued growth of supervision and control by the institutional mechanisms of various foreign organizations operating in Kosovo, allegedly for humanitarian or other activities, under indoctrination agendas;
- Complete and detailed engagement of the Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK), in all its levels, by providing full coordination through a comprehensive platform;
- Community Security Forums at the municipal level are an extremely useful mechanism, but to be effective citizens must be made aware and informed about them. The strengthening of these forums and their comprehensive communications with citizens, can have a very positive effect on the raising of awareness in general, and on violent extremism in particular.

1. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

The Security Policy Research Center - SPRC is carrying out numerous activities to promote civil society engagement against violent extremism. The municipalities covered by the project and planned activities include: Peja, Mitrovica, Gjilan, Ferizaj and Kaçanik.

During the period December 2016 - February 15, 2017, the SPRC implemented a range of activities, as a first stage, to establish thematic capacities in the prevention of violent extremism. Meanwhile, in the period between March and November 2017, the project will continue with community dialog activities in these five municipalities, contributing to the implementation of the Kosovo Strategy for the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism and Action Plan 2015-2010. Likewise, the partnerships with ten (10) civil society organizations has been established, by identifying and selecting two (2) civil society organizations for joint engagement in each of the above mentioned municipalities.

In particular, the SPRC and ten civil society organizations have jointly established the "Network of Partner Organizations Against Violent Extremism and For the Rule of Law", known as the NETWORK.

During this period of conducted activities, the number of active participants in the establishment of thematic capacities, community dialog and basic training in the five municipalities mentioned above, reached 140 active participants.

More specifically, 27 active participants in Ferizaj, 33 active participants in Kaçanik, 23 in Gjilan, 27 in Peja and 30 in Mitrovica.

The composition of activists gathered in these activities, includes different professional and commitment backgrounds. On the whole, this is the professional composition of the 140 active participants in these activities, on the basis of which this research report is compiled:

- 1 Mayor
- 1 Judge
- 6 ICK representatives at the municipal level, including three municipal head imams
- 1 representative of the Catholic Church
- 15 professors, including theologians and different fields
- 7 municipal officials
- 7 representatives of the Kosovo Police in municipal stations

- 6 psychologists
- 5 sociologists
- 91 civil society activists, among them 48 students, and 43 leaders and officials of civil society organizations.

These activities are part of the project "Promoting Civil Society Engagement Against Violent Extremism", which directly contributes to the support and implementation of the National Strategy Against Violent Extremism, and the strategic objectives in the "**Preliminary Identification of the Causes, Factors, Targeted Groups, and Radical Methods**", with emphasis on sub-objectives: "Identification of the targeted population for radicalization" and "Early identification of factors that affect radicalization"¹.

NGOs, youth activists, media, local and national authorities, have held a series of trainings that shall improve their knowledge and understanding of the problems associated with the National Strategy Against Violent Extremism, which shall better prepare them to play their role in confronting these sensitive issues, such as terrorism.

NGOs and young activists will be proactively engaged in all phases of the project, making sure that they develop joint ownership of the whole process, including the analysis of the collected data, the identification of recommendations, the development and implementation of local initiatives (action plans) and strategies/advocacy plans, contributions to the preparation and publication of monitoring reports, and their presentation to key local, national and foreign actors.

¹ Republic of Kosovo, Strategy for the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism 2015-2020 p. 18-20

2. CONTEXT OF THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS AND SPREADING OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KOSOVO

In our study, through the methodology of semi-structured interviews, focus groups and local dialog on what is the path to radicalization of young men and women in Kosovo, we necessarily consider the following essential elements:

- The vulnerabilities of young people, mainly those who are in the transitional stage of life;
- Factors and stages of radicalization, with special emphasis on initial exposure and indoctrination;
- Propaganda, or manipulation of their sentiments;
- Individual aspects, social and economic status respectively.

The key findings from all categories, with which we develop our engagement², have resulted in a number of common conclusions that the ideology of violent extremism, which recognizes terrorism as the primary tool, is spread through:

- Propaganda and Social Networks
- Radical leaders/religious interpreters, even within Kosovo, but with particular emphasis on those coming from abroad and without coordination with the Islamic Community of Kosovo;
- Supposedly humanitarian organizations, which operate in Kosovo without proper control, under indoctrination agendas;
- Quite precise targeting of individuals who can be indoctrinated through manipulation of religious sentiments and their lack of basic religious knowledge;
- Manipulative narrative used by different individuals on the present and eternity of these young people;
- Participation in the group, namely the attraction created by the group.

² SPRC activities in cooperation with the Initiative for Activism and AVONET, with 27 participants in Ferizaj on February 2, 2017, in cooperation with FOJK and KVRL: 33 participants in Kacanik on February 4, 2017, in cooperation with Apon and AgroEko: with 23 participants in Gjilan on February 7, 2017, in cooperation with the Vision Eye and KVRL: with 27 participants in Peja on February 10, 2017, in cooperation with the Option and with Hand on Heart: with 30 participants in Mitrovica on February 11, 2017

2.1 Radicalization - indispensability of increased awareness and education

It is perfectly clear that there is no easy answer to the radicalization process, since the range of factors can affect different individuals in various manners, degrees and lengths of time.

As radicalization is growing, but in a more insidious manner than before³, and most of the work in connection with counter strategies should focus more on prevention, violent extremism is now in a situation that has begun to be under control, and it has affected a small number of citizens, who are a minority within the Muslim community.

In Kosovo, current radicalism can be described as the progressive development of extreme beliefs and ideologies which question the values of the Republic. The origin of radicalization seems to lie in certain predisposed persons, frustrated with their lives and the society that surrounds them. They are easily spotted by extremist movements, which offer these disoriented young people a "meaning" and a "mission".⁴ Originally, long-term radicalization targeting, recruitment and mobilization efforts of externally funded networks, were conducted in the southern part of Kosovo and in the north-western part of Macedonia. These networks have often been led by graduates of religious institutions in the Middle East, who are involved in the spreading of an ultra-conservative form of Islam mixed with a political agenda.⁵

The views of local civil society activists, local institutions' officials, security providers, students and young people, primarily converge on the indispensability of clear and proper addressal of the issues related with violent extremism in Kosovo.

In many cases, the general feeling created among these activists is associated with an elevated level of misunderstandings and manipulations with various terms and definitions thrown to the public at different times.

"Very rarely are we able to build a clear and comprehensive debate on these issues; almost everything takes place in an uproar of labeling, which does provide room for the public to understand the essence. This has particularly affected young people, who have then fallen into

³ Personal interview with Gerta Zaimi, researcher at the Strategic Studies Center of the University of Florence, March 13, 2017.

⁴ Personal interview with Dr. Gjon Culaj, Professor of International Relations, ISPE College, March 10, 2017

⁵ Adrian Shtuni, Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo”, USIP: Washington DC: 2016, <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR397-Dynamics-of-Radicalization-and-Violent-Extremism-in-Kosovo.pdf> - pg 1.

the whirlpool of different ideological manipulations, based on their ignorance of the basic elements of religion".⁶

In fact, the lack of basic knowledge about the Islamic faith can be described as one of the causes of increased vulnerability of young people to be radicalized and join different networks that have spread this ideology. *"Ignorance and improper knowledge of the right principles and religious teachings by youth, derived from their contacts with leaders of hardline religious interpretations, and the literature served in this regard. Inability to distinguish between religious teachings and religious political ideologies, driven from outside. Following and obeying certain religious preachers - their glorification and sanctification. Perception of religious sermons on emotional rather than rational, comparative and analytical grounds."⁷*

In terms of the level of average education of young Kosovars who have joined terrorist organizations, it is consistently regarded as one of the important dimensions that have affected the process over time.

"A foreign fighter from Kosovo is less educated than the average foreign fighters at the time of joining ISIS, according to a study based on the registration forms of foreign fighters gathered at the border between Syria and Turkey, between mid 2013 and mid 2014."⁸

Indeed, education is repeatedly emphasized as one of the most important aspects in confronting this ideology and preventing its spreading. *"The best way to combat radicalization and extremism that leads to terrorism is through good, qualitative and comprehensive education, and by cultivating coexistence, tolerance and diversity in the education system"⁹.*

The issue of lack of religious knowledge is also cited regarding terrorist organizations, based on forms of interpretations and actions across different years. *"... The ugly truth is that they [ISIS] are acting on the basis of literal and out of context interpretation of only a few Quranic verses, which according to them incite to war and the killing of non-Muslims. However, none of them*

⁶ Focus Group Discussion, February 2017, Ferizaj

⁷ Excerpts from lecture of Prof. Dr. Xhabir Hamiti, Professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, during SPRC training activities with activists in municipalities, 2-11 February 2017.

⁸ Adrian Shtuni, Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo”, USIP: Washington DC: 2016, <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR397-Dynamics-of-Radicalization-and-Violent-Extremism-in-Kosovo.pdf> , p. 4

⁹ Excerpts from the speech of Minister of Education, Science and Technology, Arsim Bajrami, at the conference "Civil Society Engagement Against Violent Extremism", SPRC, Prishtina: February 28, 2017, <http://masht.rks-gov.net/article/ministri-bajrami-mori-pjese-ne-konferencen-angazhimi-i-shoqerise-civile-kunder-ekstremizmit-te-dhunshem>, last accessed on March 14, 2017 (14:30 pm)

has any religious knowledge. Their knowledge is shallow, just based on those verses planted into their brains without the correct contextual interpretation and far from prophetic tradition...".¹⁰

Interpretation in direct conflict with the prophetic tradition is evidenced in the literature, which also had an impact on the spreading of this ideology. *"Radical, extremist and terrorist groups are the product of the ideology evidenced in some religious books, which today are found in almost every home and mosque, if not in every country in the Islamic world and beyond. More precisely, such extremists ideology is developed mainly through fabricated hadiths¹¹ and distorted interpretations of parts of the Quran, for which the Prophet Muhammad is apostrophized, and which in fact are in direct contradiction with the prophetic tradition and the text itself of the Quran."¹²*

However, it is common to find it difficult to conceptualize the general, basic and fundamental knowledge in the Kosovo society and in public institutions, in order to distinguish whether certain interpretations constitute elements of the ideology of violent extremism. One of the first steps to combat this phenomenon is to recognize and accept it as a problem in our society¹³. Central-level institutions have solid knowledge of the ideologies that lead to violent extremism, but this is not enough; such knowledge must be transmitted to all levels of government, so that together they may extend the reach of their actions to easily-vulnerable individuals in a given community.¹⁴ Knowledge of the ideology is at a very low level, and it is almost non-existent in the population. Institutions have adopted slogans and copy-pasted definitions, while even the NGOs that are dealing with this problem on the ground lack proper knowledge of the theoretical side of this ideology.¹⁵

¹⁰ Gerta Zaimi, researcher at the Strategic Studies Center of the University of Florence, <http://tesheshi.com/ekskluzive-flet-gerta-zaimi-eksperte-l-se-mesme-ceshte-isis-i-cpo-ndodh-ne-siri-dhe-kush-i-coi-shqiptaret-atje/>, January 4, 2016, last accessed on March 5, 2017, 14:00

¹¹ Hadiths - Words of the prophet Muhammad narrated by friends after his death

¹² Excerpts from lecture of Prof. Dr. Xhabir Hamiti, Professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, during SPRC training activities with activists in municipalities, 2-11 February 2017.

¹³ Excerpts from the speech of Minister of Justice, Dhurata Hoxha, at the conference "Civil Society Engagement Against Violent Extremism", SPRC, Prishtina: February 28, 2017, <http://md.rks-gov.net/page.aspx?id=1,39,1691>, last accessed on March 12, 2017 (17:30)

¹⁴ Personal interview with Dr. Gjon Culaj, Professor of International Relations, ISPE College, March 10, 2017

¹⁵ Personal interview with Gerta Zaimi, researcher at the Strategic Studies Center of the University of Florence, March 13, 2017.

2.2 Group Radicalization - Group Inclusion

Theories of movements and networks underline that radicalization is a social process, particularly prevalent in small groups. Radicalization is about 'who you know'.¹⁶

Although radical convictions do not necessarily imply the negative character of a person, individual vulnerabilities could be targeted by leaders or promoters of a certain ideology. Believing or expressing the belief that major or extreme social, economic or political changes must take place¹⁷, does not necessarily imply a negative and harmful approach for the society. Radicals are identified as leaders and promoters, but those identified as "domestic terrorists" are rarely described as radical. Instead, they are constantly presented as individuals who are already radicalized.¹⁸

After all, radicalization is *"the process of adopting for oneself or inculcating in others a commitment not only to a system of [radical] beliefs, but to their imposition on the rest of society"*¹⁹. Although terrorists commit horrible acts, they rarely match the profile of the classic psychopath. They are also not necessarily from a lower socioeconomic status or less educated than their peers.²⁰

Many researchers see three to five stages from the beginning to the end of the radicalization process, from initial exposure through indoctrination, to training and then violent actions. However, these stages are alternatively conceptualized by other scholars who use different terminology to identify and explain them. There is broad consensus that of the many people initiated in this process, not all of them necessarily go through all these stages before becoming terrorists.²¹

¹⁶ Prevent Strategy. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf, pg. 17

¹⁷ Cambridge Dictionary, <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/radical>

¹⁸ National Communication Association, Communication Currents, Volume 10 , Issue 2, Washington DC - April 2015, <https://www.natcom.org/CommCurrentsArticle.aspx?id=6009>

¹⁹ Brian Michael Jenkins, "Outside Experts View," preface to Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process. Washington, DC: FDD's Center for Terrorism Research, 2009.

²⁰ Randy Borum, "Understanding Terrorist Psychology," in Andrew Silke, ed. The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism. Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2010.

²¹ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - DEFENSE HUMAN RESOURCES ACTIVITY, <http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/osg/terrorism/radicalization.htm>

Involvement in certain groups is one of the direct influences on the individual, hinging on one of the basic youth vulnerabilities. Membership in various groups is followed by the inculcation of loyalty towards the group leader or leaders. *"The real power of these groups lies in the mastery and dominance of leaders - religious figures to render their followers obedient and submissive. Therefore, the first prerequisites for any membership in such a religious extremist group are obedience and submission to orders arising from their leader, a condition which they consider more important than prayer and fasting, which are the fundamental pillars of Islam".*²² The mosque is not the place where people are recruited for extremism or terrorism; instead, very small groups discuss these phenomena and conduct recruiting at private meetings or homes.²³

Moreover, the presence of such leaders in Kosovo has been identified by the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo, clarifying part of their basic modus operandi. "... activities of the persons with radical religious, political and nationalist beliefs is present in the Republic of Kosovo, mainly in invoking people, which includes nationalist/religious lectures, internet propaganda, organizations through different groups and NGO's, even in other fields such as sports, among fan groups and hooligan groups etc."²⁴

In this regard, the role of central institutions is very important to counter the growth of any radicalism. To this purpose, investments should be made in academic and scientific research by various actors, without creating a monopoly over the topic, in order to analyze radicalization causes in Kosovo, to encourage debate on these topics, to eradicate stigmatization and Islamophobia in the media, and to regulate the law related to the ICK.²⁵ Control of monetary funds and flows of all non-governmental associations or organizations in the country. Create opportunities through cooperation and scholarships to establish professional staff with different profiles, who shall deal with the rehabilitation of returnees, but also with the families of those who have not returned, or those who are in prison. Over a long time, work must be done to improve social and economic conditions of citizens.²⁶

²² Excerpts from lecture of Prof. Dr. Xhabir Hamiti, Professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, during SPRC training activities with activists in municipalities, 2-11 February 2017.

²³ <http://www.evropaelire.org/a/28307012.html>, Skender Perteshi, QKSS, February 13, 2017

²⁴ Republic of Kosovo, Strategy for the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism 2015-2020, p. 9

²⁵ Personal interview with Gerta Zaimi, researcher at the Strategic Studies Center of the University of Florence, March 13, 2017.

²⁶ Ibid.

2.3 Youth Vulnerabilities

According to our analysis, the binding of a sense of frustration with that of victimization, has had an extremely high level of influence on the increased vulnerability of young people in Kosovo. Consequently, they are manipulated by individuals or networks that operate in Kosovo and the region. In Kosovo's reality, individuals and especially young people are constantly faced with strictly black and white interpretations of issues. **This increases the level of frustration.** When one adds the sense of perceived injustice, the isolation, the absence of specific standards, the search for scapegoats, gaps in opportunities and the socio-economic situation, in many cases **the level of the sense of victimization can only increase.**

Despite substantial improvements in the socio-political reality of the country and the living conditions since the war in Kosovo, chronic vulnerabilities have affected the environment and facilitated radicalization.²⁷ The reasons that push certain individuals to radicalization are numerous; ranging from the lack of integration into society, socio-economic problems, poor education and contact with extremist individuals, groups or organizations. Another important factor is the lack of secular affirmation and regulation by law of religious communities, a law which would protect our religions from religious ideologies and extremism.²⁸

"We can never know all of the reasons why extremism takes hold in the hearts of some, driving them away from family and community into a darker, more violent world. But we are learning more and more about the roots of this radicalization, how it preys on young people at their most vulnerable – when they are jobless, when they see themselves without prospects or cause for dignity, when they feel most disconnected from the communities that nurtured them."²⁹

While researchers have not identified the causes of terrorism, they have identified three vulnerabilities that could provide a source of motivation or make it possible to accept/use violence. These vulnerabilities are:³⁰

²⁷ Adrian Shtuni, *Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo*, USIP: Washington DC: 2016, <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR397-Dynamics-of-Radicalization-and-Violent-Extremism-in-Kosovo.pdf>, pg 1.

²⁸ Personal interview with Dr. Gjon Culaj, Professor of International Relations, ISPE College, March 10, 2017

²⁹ Excerpts from the speech of US Ambassador to Kosovo, Greg Delawie, at the conference "Civil Society Engagement Against Violent Extremism", SPRC, Prishtina: February 28, 2017, <https://xk.usembassy.gov/sq/civil-society-engagement-counter-terror-extremism-2/>, last accessed on March 12, 2017, 18:00

³⁰ Martha Crenshaw, "The Subjective Reality of the Terrorist: Ideological and Psychological Factors in Terrorism," in Robert O. Slater & Michael Stohl, eds., *Current Perspectives in International Terrorism*. Hampshire, UK: Macmillan, 1988, p. 59., as quoted in: <http://www.dhrra.mil/perserec/osc/terrorism/radicalization.htm>

Perceived Injustice or Humiliation: *Violent actions may be perceived as proper compensation to injustice or humiliation.*

Need for Belonging: Many prospective terrorists find in a radical extremist group not only a sense of meaning, but also a sense of belonging, connectedness, and affiliation. *For the individuals who become active terrorists, the initial attraction is often to the group, or community of believers, rather than to an abstract ideology or to violence.*

Need for Identity: An individual's search for identity may draw him or her to extremist or terrorist organizations in a variety of ways. The individual may be searching for a purpose or goal in life that defines the actions required to achieve that goal. A violent act can be seen as a way to succeed at something that could make a difference. The absolutist, "**black and white**" nature of most extremist ideologies is often attractive to those who feel overwhelmed by the complexity and stress of navigating a complicated world. Without struggling to define oneself or discern personal meaning, an individual may choose to define his or her identity simply through identification with a cause or membership in a group.

However, There is no single way of identifying who is likely to be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.

Factors that may have a bearing on someone becoming vulnerable may include:³¹ : peer pressure, influence from other people or via the internet, bullying, crime against them or their involvement in crime, anti social behaviour, family tensions, race/hate crime, lack of self esteem or identity and personal or political grievances.

³¹ Channel Guidance.

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/425189/Channel_Duty_Guidance_April_2015.pdf, p. 10

3. CLUSTERING OF FACTORS INFLUENCING RADICALIZATION AND DISSEMINATION OF THE IDEOLOGY OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

3.1 Cluster 1: Individual Aspect

1. Sense of individual frustration, marginalization and injustice
2. Lack of general education and religious education
3. Lack of information on developments in Syria
4. Targeting of teenagers, especially in schools
5. Feelings of isolation of youth
6. Low capacity and professional integrity of individuals, institutions
7. Desire for status
8. Desire for excitement and adventure
9. Need to dominate and control others
10. Desire for social or moral change
11. Involvement of family or friends in extremism
12. Being in a transitional period of life
13. Being influenced or controlled by a group





1. Ideological Reasons
2. Instrumentalisation of religion for extremist purposes
3. Dissemination of doctrine of rigid, non-alternative interpretation of religion (indoctrination)
4. Radical imams/interpreters and especially the arrival of religious lecturers from abroad and without coordination with the ICK
5. Influence over individuals - especially in cases that do not have family religious tradition
6. Propaganda (especially online) and social networks
7. Inadequate literature
8. Footage from Syria: massacres and violence in Syria
9. Counter-effects of mass media disinformation on the war in Syria, prejudice, labeling

3.3 Cluster 3: Socio-Economic Aspects and the Operation of Various Organizations

1. Operation of foreign associations and foundations with ideological motives
2. Funding not completely controlled
3. Logistic and material support



3.4 Cluster 4: Difficulties in the Overall Understanding of the Phenomenon



1. Early tendencies to ignore the phenomenon
2. Late reaction and rise of lack of trust (dilemmas) in the institutional response
3. Often inadequate narrative in the face of such ideology.

4. WHAT MUST BE DONE?

Programs should focus on communities and local initiatives. The orientation of the various national and international actors and stakeholders in addressing the prevention of violent radicalization and extremism should be fully under ownership of local activists, community-based organizations and local initiatives, based on the specifics of each locality.

4.1 *What have we learned so far?*

1. Everything happens in the community. Therefore, the community is the mechanism that can best prevent the expansion of this ideology and reduce youth radicalization;
2. The thematic capacities of different local actors must be strengthened. In this area, it is extremely necessary to establish thematic capacities for municipal institutions, civil society, schools (teachers and headmasters), community-based organizations, as well as families.
3. Local Initiatives for the prevention of violent extremism and radicalization should be strongly increased. These local initiatives should include the family, childhood friends, school friends, work colleagues, the neighborhood, or settlement, in order to include the entire community.
4. The capacities of the Community Security Forums must be increased, and public awareness of the existence and potential of these forums must be raised.

4.2 *ICK Engagement*

It is clear that the role of the Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK) is one of the most important in preventing the spreading of violent extremism in the name of religion, as well as in the deradicalization of individuals. *"The Islamic Community of Kosovo, explicitly distances itself*

from youth manipulations through doctrines that have nothing to do with Islam. They are manipulating youth for purely political reasons and they have nothing to do with religion ³²

In fact, to achieve a higher level of success, the overall coordination of activities to prevent violent extremism is indispensable. The actions of law enforcement institutions, despite having had big effects, can not be seen as the only way to achieve sweeping success. *"... it is the civil society, religious communities, the entire social and political spectrum of the country, that must do more than the Kosovo Police, which is an excellent police force, but can not do everything"*³³.

Perennially, the ICK has been asked to play a more active role. The ICK has played its significant role in clarifying the doctrines of the Islamic faith in relation to the doctrines used for manipulative purposes³⁴. However, better coordination of all state and non-state actors is indispensable. In more advanced stages, the recruitment of young individuals to join terrorist groups in war zones in Syria and Iraq is made through closed and private methods, based on the operation of certain groups, which have managed to build submissive liaisons between individuals and certain leaders.³⁵ Interpretations in these kinds of groups are based on individual approaches and have nothing to do with divine aspects. *"Individuals and groups who follow this misguided ideology, apart from the appropriated hadiths, rely even on fatwas/religious edicts of scholars of different times, considering them sacred, without thinking and reasoning that their decisions are human and not divine in character."*³⁶

However, the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo, particularly the security institutions, which have done a great job in discovering and preventing terrorist plots, may serve only to treat the symptoms of radicalization and not the cause of it.³⁷

³² Excerpts from the speech of the Head Imam of the Islamic Community of Kosovo, Sabri Bajgora, at the conference "Civil Society Engagement Against Violent Extremism", SPRC, Prishtina: February 28, 2017.

³³ Excerpts from the speech of Minister of Interior, Skender Hyseni, at the conference "Civil Society Engagement Against Violent Extremism", SPRC, Prishtina: February 28, 2017, <http://mpb.rks-gov.net/News.aspx?ID=905>, last accessed on March 12, 2017 (16:00).

³⁴ Excerpts from the speech of the Head Imam of the Islamic Community of Kosovo, Sabri Bajgora, at the conference "Civil Society Engagement Against Violent Extremism", SPRC, Prishtina: February 28, 2017.

³⁵ Findings from the Kacanik Focus Group, on February 4, 2017.

³⁶ Excerpts from lecture of Prof. Dr. Xhabir Hamiti, Professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, during SPRC training activities with activists in municipalities, 2-11 February 2017.

³⁷ Republic of Kosovo, Strategy for the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism 2015-2020, p. 4

5. ROLE OF MUNICIPALITIES: COMMUNITY SECURITY FORUMS

5.1 Community Security Forums in Kosovo

As the most direct local mechanisms in liaison with the citizens and the community as a whole, the Community Security Forums are extremely important to address problems or difficulties of various dimensions. Community Security Forums represent an extremely valuable mechanism to support the implementation of security initiatives in the community.

Using these local mechanisms to address issues dealing with radicalization and the spreading of violent extremism visibly facilitates the identification of cases, influencing factors and direct causes. Although so far there have been periods and certain activities that relate the role of the Community Security Forums to the prevention of violent extremism, the level of knowledge of local citizens and activists, in municipalities covered by the SPRC project, is not sufficient.³⁸

These forums bring together members of local communities, police officers and local partners and institutions working together to improve community security and quality of life. They act as consultative bodies, whose role is to raise awareness about the nature of crime, disorder and violent behavior and identify security issues.

The multiple level of the Community Security Infrastructure encompasses the philosophy that community members should work together with the responsible leaders in open and accountable partnerships to effect change in their communities.

Three types of forums are established in Kosovo to support the notion of security in the community:

1. Municipal Community Safety Council (MCSC)
2. Local Public Safety Committees (LPSC)
3. Action Teams for Community Safety (ATCS)

³⁸ On the basis of discussions in focus groups and dialogs in the community in Ferizaj, Kaçanik, Gjilan, Peja and Mitrovica, the SPRC found that citizens and local activists are not sufficiently aware of the existence, functioning, responsibilities and capacities of these Community Security Forums in their municipalities. Consequently, it is indispensable to establish the capacities of these forums.



Figure: Security Forums. Source, OSCE, Department of Public Safety, Sector for Development of Security in Community

5.2 *Municipal Community Safety Council (MCSC)*

The Municipal Safety Council (MCSC), established between the security forums hierarchy or municipal level, is an inter-agency consultative body for local security issues. Since their establishment, the MCSCs are intended to serve as community mechanisms for consultations on security, and their objective is to support the coordination of security structures at the local level, and to contribute to a safe and secure environment.³⁹ In line with the decentralization process, the MCSCs have the potential to become powerful actors in the field of public security. The decentralization process has transferred some powers from the central to the municipal level. As the main mechanism of local consultations on security, the MCSCs are based on meetings of various stakeholders who can add value to the local security debate.

The establishment of MCSCs in Kosovo was based on UNMIK Regulation No.2005/54, which aimed at greater involvement of the community in local interactions between police and the municipality.

³⁹ Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS), Report on Municipal Community Safety Councils, Evaluation and Supervision of Democratic Governance Mechanisms of Municipal Community Safety Council. Prishtina: 2010

The importance of the MCSCs has increased after approval of the Administrative Instruction No. 08/2009 MIA - 02/2009 MLGA on Municipal Community Safety Councils, which instructs the mayors/chairpersons of the MCSCs to lead functional forums for community security at the municipal level, in close cooperation with the Kosovo Police. Moreover, the active involvement of police station commanders was further promoted by the Administrative Instruction no. 13/2009 "Police Cooperation with municipalities and communities."

The National Strategy on Community Security defines the MCSCs "as municipal advisory bodies on security issues, which in cooperation with the police, analyze and review all the community security issues for the benefit of all citizens living in the municipality. The purpose of the MCSCs is to raise awareness about different types of crime, disturbance of peace and violent behavior within the local community, and to identify local concerns regarding public security"⁴⁰.

The Administrative Instruction no. 08/2009 MIA - 02/2009 MLGA, defines the MCSCs as *"the main municipal consultative body for security issues, which in cooperation with police, reviews and resolves all security issues for all communities in the interests of the all citizens within the municipality"*. Now, the establishment of MCSCs is based on the Administrative Instruction no. 27/2012 MIA - 03/2012 MLGA on Municipal Community Safety Councils, supported in the aforementioned documents.⁴¹

This Administrative Instruction stipulates the establishment, composition, objectives, tasks and responsibilities of the Municipal Community Safety Councils in each municipality of the Republic of Kosovo, and it also regulates the manner of their functioning⁴². Under this instruction, each municipality must establish its MCSC by decision to be issued by the municipal assembly.⁴³ The MCSC's composition shall reflect all-inclusiveness. The mayor is also the chair of the MCSC⁴⁴. Other representatives are the commander of the police station of the municipality, representatives of religious communities, representatives of all ethnic communities,

⁴⁰ National Strategy on Community Security and Action Plan 2011-2016, II.3 Mechanisms

⁴¹ The Administrative Instruction no. 08/2009 MIA - 02/2009 MLGA on Municipal Community Safety Councils was amended this year, because it was considered unenforceable, primarily to address the issue of compensation for members' participation in MCSC meetings. For more details see Section 18 of the Administrative Instruction no. 27/2012 MIA - 03/2012 MLGA on Municipal Community Safety Councils

⁴² Administrative Instruction no. 27/2012 MIA - 03/2012 MLGA on Municipal Community Safety Councils

⁴³ *ibid*, Article 3

⁴⁴ *ibid*, Article 8.1

directors of the relevant municipal departments, representatives of the Kosovo Security Force, representative of the Local Public Safety Committee and Action Teams for Community Security, representatives of NGOs, media, business community, persons with disabilities⁴⁵ etc.

Some of the objectives of the MCSCs are:⁴⁶

- Increasing citizens' awareness regarding the nature of crimes, disorders and violent behaviors in the local community;
- Identifying concerns, recommending action plans and relaying them to municipal authorities;
- Building trust between police and citizens by building partnerships and joint initiatives for solving security problems in each community;
- Representing the views and concerns of all citizens on issues of crime and other issues related to the quality of life.

The MCSCs shall prepare an annual work plan and develop projects to increase and improve community security⁴⁷, and that deal with the identification of negative phenomena that tend to disturb public security, and shall recommend action plans⁴⁸. Cooperation with police⁴⁹ in preventing actions which threaten community security, and with central institutions⁵⁰ dealing with public security, in order to create a safer environment in the community, as well as entering into cooperation agreements with MCSCs of neighboring municipalities⁵¹ on community security issues that exceed the limits of their municipality, which are necessary to maximize the effects on the creation of community security.

For the realization of projects, the MCSC can seek support from the Municipal Assembly for the financing of projects⁵² and, through the municipality, can request from any non-governmental organization to finance projects related to community security⁵³. The MCSC is expected to hold at least six (6) meetings per year, three (3) of which must be held in the first six months of the

⁴⁵ Ibid, Article 4

⁴⁶ Ibid, Article 5

⁴⁷ Ibid, Article 6, paragraph 1.1

⁴⁸ Ibid, Article 6, paragraph 1.1

⁴⁹ Ibid 1.3

⁵⁰ Ibid 1.4

⁵¹ Ibid 1.5

⁵² Ibid 1.6

⁵³ Ibid 1.7

calendar year;⁵⁴ it may meet more often, or on the basis of need and requirements. In MCSC meetings, decisions on issues that require voting, are made by majority of votes of the present members.⁵⁵

5.3 *Action Teams for Community Safety - ATCS*

Part of the strength of a society lies in the willingness of citizens to make a difference.⁵⁶

The Department of Justice of the United States, in partnership with the Department of Public Security of the OSCE mission in Kosovo, in 2003, initiated the program "Action Teams for Community Safety" as a pilot program in four (4) municipalities in Kosovo.⁵⁷ The ATCSs consist of interested residents, police officers and municipal officials, who come together to work in partnership with other stakeholders to identify and implement solutions for security and order problems they face in their communities. Based on the philosophy of community-oriented police, the function of ATCSs is to bridge people and institutions that deal with various issues, such as environment, traffic safety, poor living conditions in the community and anti-social behavior in schools, which are very important.

Since the inception of the program in 2003, the ATCSs treated different roots of crime, security concerns and order, from traffic safety to domestic violence, from violence in schools to the dangers of stray dogs.

Each ATCS is formed as a result of a thorough selection and training program, before starting their work to create viable partnerships to identify community concerns, followed by the implementation of long-term solutions from the bottom up.⁵⁸

The program is methodologically designed to engage and establish volunteer teams from the community, police and local government officials, to work together in order to identify and set

⁵⁴ Ibid, Article 11.1

⁵⁵ Ibid, Article 12.1

⁵⁶ Department of Justice of the United States, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, Training Action Teams for Community Safety 2012, leaflet on the program "Together for a safer community"

⁵⁷ Department of Justice of the United States, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program and OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Department of Public Safety "Action Teams for Community Safety - Impact Assessment", 2008.

⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 11

priorities and find common solutions to security problems in the community such as crime, freedom of movement and living conditions.⁵⁹

Each ATCS is made up of its members, team leaders and one or two coordinators. At regular intervals, the coordinators of the CSATs meet in an inter-municipal forum⁶⁰ in order to share ideas, resources, best practices, and discuss the current challenges and successes.⁶¹

The CSAT Program is based on the principles of community policing and trying to build new connections and support the current relations between citizens, the community, the Kosovo police at the local level and local government officials.⁶² The CSATs represent the common people, because they represent a wide cross-section of volunteers of all ages, professions and backgrounds/status.

The training program of CSAT members incorporates communication and facilitation, partnership building, problem solving, conflict resolution, as well as the project's action plan. This program also applies to the training of police officers in the community⁶³ in order to ensure identical knowledge, common understanding of the concept and harmonious interaction between members and police officers.

Since their establishment, the CSATs have had a significant impact on security issues and in enhancing the quality of life in the communities in Kosovo. One issue regularly addressed by CSATs with considerable success, is traffic safety. CSATs have shown effectiveness in dealing with security issues in the community, such as: placement of traffic signs near schools, addressing various forms of theft, problems with stray dogs, interethnic reconciliation and reintegration, hooliganism and violence in schools, domestic violence, environmental projects and many more other issues, which make CSATs an essential part of the Kosovo infrastructure for community security.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Department of Justice of the United States, International Assistance in Criminal Investigation Program, Training Action Teams for Community Safety 2012, leaflet on the program "Together for a safer community"

⁶⁰ Since 2003, the MCSCs Executive Council has held over 30 meetings

⁶¹ Department of Justice of the United States, International Assistance in Criminal Investigation Program, Training Action Teams for Community Safety 2012, leaflet on the program "Together for a safer community"

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Department of Justice of the United States, International Assistance in Criminal Investigation Program, Training Action Teams for Community Safety 2012, leaflet on the program "Together for a safer community"

⁶⁴ Ibid.

One of the main concerns related to the development of the security sector in Kosovo, was the lack of local ownership, especially during the first and second stage⁶⁵. CSAT are included by the Kosovo government in the National Strategy for Community Security⁶⁶ and in the Strategy of the Kosovo Police for Community Safety,⁶⁷ which as documents refer to community security policies, as well as the administrative instruction for MCSCs.⁶⁸

5.4 Local Public Safety Committees - LPSC

As one of the security forums pertaining to the basic level of the hierarchy of the community security infrastructure in Kosovo, the LPSCs include the highest number of people that represent the community in general. The LPSCs are able to address issues of security, crime, safety and life from the bottom-up through the establishment of positive and effective partnerships, by using the process of problem solution. Through open channels of mutual communication and cooperation, the LPSCs support the work of MSCSs.

LPSCs were created under UNMIK Regulation 2005/54 on the Framework and Guiding Principles of the Kosovo Police Service.⁶⁹ After the completion of the transition from UNMIK Police to the Kosovo Police, the Law on Kosovo Police (adopted in 2008 and later amended in 2011) in article 7 “Community Relations” has transferred the authority to decide regarding the establishment of LPSCs to the Director General of the Kosovo Police.

The purpose of the LPSCs is to provide local communities with a voice in the policing of their areas, to be consultative bodies in the field of crime and security, identifying issues of concern, development and implementation of effective projects, to address these issues at the local level, in a close working relationship with Municipal authorities, local communities and police.

⁶⁵ The post-conflict period (1999 - 2005) saw the launching of efforts for the democratization and development of the security sector. In this period, decision-making rested with the international presence, which involved UNMIK as one of the main actors. The period 2005 - 2008 marks the transfer of powers and reform of security institutions.

⁶⁶ "Duties and responsibilities: CSATs are various groups of people including representatives from the community, local governments and police, which aim at identifying and addressing issues related to crime, safety and quality of life, to achieve the common goal of creating a safer community. CSATs are established by ICITAP Program/Department of Justice - USA and assisted by the OSCE mission in Kosovo. See strategy pg. 17

⁶⁷ See the document, action plan

⁶⁸ See article 1.10 and 1.11. of AI no. 27/2012 MIA - 03/2012 MLGA on Municipal Community Safety Councils

⁶⁹ See UNMIK Regulation No. 2005/54 on the Framework and Guiding Principles of the Kosovo Police Service, December 20, 2005, http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/02english/E2005regs/RE2005_54.pdf

LPSCs are local consultative and advisory bodies to station commander, who must consult LPSCs about the level of crime and disturbance of peace and order in their area, in this way they keep them informed and aware on issues of local security. LPSCs can help identify methods of development and effective implementation of projects and action plans that directly affect those problems.⁷⁰ They play an important role in providing vertical and horizontal connections between the institutions and citizens of Kosovo in an infrastructure of community security.

The idea of the establishment and existence of the LPSCs is to develop new relations and support between community members, municipal and police representatives, creating multiple forums for interaction and to provide inclusiveness. The premise is that people shall work together towards a common goal, by respecting and trusting each other, by building a strong foundation to address common concerns and to solve local issues. The desired outcomes of this community interaction are reduction of crime and improvement of life and security in the community.⁷¹

In March 2011, was created the legal framework of the LPSCs, "General Conditions for the Establishment and Operation of Local Public Safety Committees" adopted by the General Director of Kosovo Police,⁷² with instructions for LPSC members. This framework helps them receive significant support in identifying, designing and proposing solutions to community problems and challenges. According to Article 7.5 of the Law on Police (no. 04/L-076) the Director General shall have the right to establish Local Public Safety Committee (LPSC) as an advisory body within any specific area in each municipality, whenever it is in the best interest of the community and effective community policing⁷³.

The General Conditions for Local Public Safety Committees define the LPSC *"as a consultative body which should be informed of the nature and level of crime, disorder and violent behavior, to recognize the security issues and identify the methods of developing and implementing effective projects and action plans. The LPSC shall address issues of local crime, community safety issues and living conditions to the relevant institutions."*⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Kosovo Police, Standard Operating Procedures for Local Public Safety Committees, March 9, 2011, Chapter V, Role and Responsibility of the LPSC, paragraph 1

⁷¹ The Capacity Building Program for Local Public Safety Committees, Security and Public Order Department, OSCE Mission in Kosovo

⁷² The General Conditions for Local Public Safety Committees were drafted by an inter-institutional working group and approved by the Director General of the KP in 2011.

⁷³ In a geographic area of responsibility of a police station, one or more LPSCs may be established, always based on the need to analyze their existence, see: Kosovo Police, Standard Operating Procedures for Local Public Safety Committees, March 9, 2011, Chapter V, Procedures, paragraph 4

⁷⁴ Kosovo Police, General Conditions for Local Public Safety Committees, chapter: General Principles.

Based on the Kosovo Police Law and the general conditions, the LPSCs may be established in two ways⁷⁵:

- *The community can initiate the establishment of the LPSC* whenever they feel it is necessary in that locality. In order to achieve this, the community should address its request to the commander of the police station.
- *Commanders of police stations may propose the establishment of the LPSCs* based on an assessment of crime trends' developments in the area of operation of the LPSC, tensions in the community or on the basis of security issues.

As formulated in this assessment, the Station Commander shall have the support of the local community and respective LPSC. LPSC members shall be selected from village leaders for the relative village/locality in close cooperation with Kosovo Police.

The composition of the LPSC should reflect the diversity of the local community. Attention should be paid to ethnicity, gender, age, religion and culture, to ensure a balanced membership and representation. Other members can include community leaders, schools, public health institutions, businesses and NGOs. The LPSC members should not have a criminal record or be involved in any activity or behavior that would destroy the LPSC's reputation.⁷⁶

LPSCs have the right to be represented in their respective MCSC by at least one member.⁷⁷ This person shall normally be the chairman of the LPSC or his/her deputy. This representative shall submit to the MCSC issues that their LPSC is unable to resolve. The General Director of KP shall designate areas in which LPSCs shall be established, in accordance with the criteria issued in the police law, and is the authority that approves the establishment of the LPSCs.

LPSC members will not have any authority in law enforcement, but they can raise their concerns to appointed police officers. The LPSC can also send copies of documents of any correspondence to the Ministry of Interior (Department of Community Safety) to discuss them.⁷⁸

Despite the fact that the representation of the LPSCs in the MCSC is guaranteed in the Administrative Instruction⁷⁹, in their role as chairs of MCSCs, mayors often do not invite LPSC

⁷⁵ See *ibid*, chapter: Procedures for establishing the LPSC.

⁷⁶ See *ibid*, chapter: Procedures for establishing the LPSC, membership in the LPSC, paragraph 5

⁷⁷ See Administrative Instruction no. 27/2012 MIA - 03/2012 MLGA on Municipal Community Safety Councils, article 1.10

⁷⁸ *Ibid*.

⁷⁹ See Administrative Instruction no. 27/2012 MIA - 03/2012 MLGA on Municipal Community Safety Councils, article 1.10 One representative of each Local Public Safety Committee;

members to meetings, which prevents them from raising concerns and addressing the issues of the communities they represent as LPSC members.⁸⁰

5.5 *In what do Community Security Forums help?*

- Community safety and social cohesion is a differentiated approach tailored to respond to the challenges of any context, and it usually includes the following key pillars:
 - Increased local good governance and strengthening of local institutions.
 - Strengthened rule of law and governance of security sector.
 - Conflict prevention and support to peace building.
 - Provide alternative opportunities for employment and better life.
 - Improved community environment and improved delivery of services.
 - Address the spreading of means of violence and demand for weapons.
 - Adoption of the public health approach towards crime and violence.
- Community policing is essentially a collaboration between police and the community to identify and solve community problems.
- Police should not be considered as the sole guardian of law and order, all members of the community become active allies in efforts to increase the safety and quality of neighborhoods.
- Community policing stresses the need for community members to mobilize and support with resources to solve problems and improve their quality of life. Community members should express their concerns, contribute with advice and take action to address these concerns.
- Security Forums should play a very important role for mayors, police, the ministry etc. These forums can identify community problems that can later be transformed into projects that can be realized through the municipal budget or by donors, thus there would be a statement of needs that would serve to coordinate and direct donations. In Kosovo, there are troops that are trained to recognize these issues and design appropriate measures.

⁸⁰ Findings from SPRC activities in cooperation with the Initiative for Activism and AVONET, with 27 participants in Ferizaj on February 2, 2017, in cooperation with FOJK and KVRL: 33 participants in Kacanik on February 4, 2017, in cooperation with Apon and AgroEko: with 23 participants in Gjilan on February 7, 2017, in cooperation with the Vision Eye and KVRL: with 27 participants in Peja on February 10, 2017, in cooperation with the Option and with Hand on Heart: with 30 participants in Mitrovica on February 11, 2017

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

General Recommendation:

Programs of prevention of violent radicalization and extremism should be based on local needs and specifications. Local actors should be maximally involved in designing the Local Initiatives and Action Plans to address this phenomenon. Each case, locality, municipality or region has its own distinct specifications, which should be reflected by the programmatic approach.

Specific recommendations:

To the Government of Kosovo:

- Organize direct communication policies and mechanisms with citizens and communities;
- Set as a budget priority the implementation of the Strategy for the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism 2015-2020 and Action Plan;
- Coordinate the activities of different actors at central and local levels to raise awareness and increase thematic capacities on extremism and violent radicalization;
- Cooperate with civil society organizations in municipalities, giving precedence to their knowledge related to community activities;

To the Assembly of Kosovo:

- Support the Government in providing budgetary capacities to central and local institutions and mechanisms for the implementation of the Strategy;
- Establish its active role in communication with municipalities, communities and citizens;

To the Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK)

- Develop and begin to implement a comprehensive program to counter propaganda that aims at indoctrination of youth based on strict, non-alternative interpretations, of religious faith;
- Supervise the implementation of the correct form of lectures' curriculum in Kosovo mosques;

- Increase engagement and communication with communities and citizens in advancing the promotion of national values and religious traditions in Kosovo;

To the Municipalities:

- Strengthen the role of the Community Security Forums and inclusion of citizens in solving problems;
- Draft action plans for the prevention of violent radicalization and extremism;
- Enhance internal thematic and institutional capacities for effective treatment of this phenomenon;
- Increase cooperation and coordination with other institutional actors and non-governmental organizations, including police, religious communities, media, community etc.

To the Civil Society and Media:

- Activities in the prevention of violent extremism and radicalization that reach the communities and citizens;
- Focus on localities, collaborate with the community and citizens;
- Increase the capacity for theoretical knowledge of the ideology of violent extremism and engage in advocacy programs.

To partners, foreign organizations and donors:

- Support local initiatives in preventing violent extremism, focusing on community initiatives;
- Support local activists through capacity strengthening, advancing opportunities for exchange of experiences from the commitments of local activists in different countries.

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